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Abstract: This article addresses the influence costs problem in the governance structure 
‘agribusiness cooperative.’  Influence costs are higher in cooperatives than in investor-
oriented firms due to the unique governance structure of the former. Hypotheses are 
formulated and tested regarding the relationship between influence costs and seven 
variables: membership size, member heterogeneity, average member age, singleness of 
purpose, managerial power over members, level of managerial compensation, and 
professional versus inside management. The main results are that heterogeneous member 
preferences, older average member age, and investment in multiple product lines all 
contribute to higher influence costs.  At the same time, cooperatives with well-paid, 
powerful and professional managers incur lower influence costs. The impact of 
membership size on the level of influence costs is undetermined. 
 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the literature on the governance of organizations has been 
significantly enriched by research that focuses on intra-firm influence costs as an 
important source of decision-making inefficiencies. Influence activities may take various 
forms. For example, employees or other key stakeholders may engage in lobbying, or 
information providing that distorts decision making to their private benefit. Taken to the 
extreme, influence activities may involve the misreporting of skill deficiencies (Watson et 
al. 2006), sabotage (Dubois 1987), or explicit conflict between individuals or groups of 
firm stakeholders (Abma 2000).  
Influence costs inevitably arise in any organization when decisions affect the 
distribution of wealth or other benefits among members or constituent groups of the 
organization and, in pursuit of their selfish interests, the affected individuals or groups 
attempt to influence the decision to their benefit (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, 600). Two 
conditions are necessary to make influence costs likely (Milgrom and Roberts 1992): First, 
a group of decisions or potential decisions must be made that can influence how the 
benefits and costs in a firm are distributed and shared, and second, the affected parties 
must have open communication channels to the decision makers during the time period 
when decisions are being made, as well as the means to influence them. Given that 
decision makers‟ ability to make sound decisions depends, among other things, on the 
information provided to them by the affected parties, influence costs arise not only when 
the affected individuals participate in decisions but indirectly as well. Organizations 
attempt to ameliorate the influence costs problem by using non-discretionary promotion 
schemes and narrowing wage differentials (Milgrom 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 1988), 
divesting poorly operating segments (Meyer et al. 1992), designing a company‟s capital 
structure (Bagwell and Zechner 1993), by adding levels of hierarchy (Inderst et al. 2005), 
and by introducing employee stock ownership plans (Matejka and De Waegenaere 2005).  
Not much attention has been paid to the study of influence activities in governance 
structures such as franchising, subcontracting, alliances, collective trademarks, and 
cooperatives (Menard 2004). In this article, this void is partially filled through the 
empirical investigation of the role of influence activities in the governance structure called 
„agribusiness cooperative1.‟ The influence costs problem is a major source of 
inefficiencies in agribusiness cooperatives (Cook 1995; Bogetoft and Olesen 2003). 
Several crucial decisions entail the (re)distribution of wealth among the members of a 
cooperative and thus may provoke influence attempts by members.  The allocation of 
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overhead costs, the assessment of members‟ product quality, and the geographical location 
of a new investment are but a few examples of such decisions (Hansmann 1996; 
Hetherington 1991). 
One way to position this article is to view it as a comparative institutional analysis. 
In addition to the influence costs identified in investor-oriented firms (IOFs), cooperatives 
incur extra influence costs due to their unique governance structure (e.g., Banerjee et al. 
2001). Cooperatives are not publicly listed. Therefore, they have no access to most of the 
instruments available to IOFs for ameliorating the constraints imposed by high influence 
costs.  
Alternatively, the article is positioned as an extension of the managerial power 
approach to the principal-agent problem (Bebchuk and Fried 2003) achieved by the 
incorporation of the influencing behavior of an agent and multiple principals.
2
 The 
members as formal owners of a cooperative delegate a substantial amount of discretion to 
the CEO, but still want to influence his or her decisions. Cooperative members exercise 
their position as owners and users of the cooperative through voting, and influence 
activities.  Each member supports the manager who maximizes his or her individual gain. 
Also, each member competes with the rest of members to capture as large a part of the 
redistributed rent as possible. At the same time, the manager maximizes her personal 
wealth by taking into account the voting behavior of members (Appelbaum and Katz 
1987).  
Several factors determine the amount of influence costs incurred by an organization. 
The theory of the cooperative firm highlights seven of them as most important. This 
research reviews these factors and states and tests hypotheses about the possible impact 
they have on influence costs.     
The article is organized as follows. The next section highlights differences between 
cooperatives and IOFs in terms of the influence costs each of these governance structures 
incurs. Section three formulates hypotheses. Section four presents case studies that 
provide a preliminary test of the hypotheses. Particularly, we shed light on how the level 
of influence attempts is affected by the size of the cooperative membership, the 
heterogeneity of member preferences, the average age of active members, the singleness 
of the cooperative‟s purpose, the degree of managerial power over members, the level of 
managerial compensation and the manager being from inside or outside. Section five 
concludes and outlines directions for future research. 
 
Cooperatives versus IOFs 
Producer-oriented firms incur higher influence costs than their IOF counterparts for 
several reasons. First, traditional cooperatives have adopted a unique governance 
structure. Decision and income rights are allocated to member-patrons who are either the 
suppliers or customers of the cooperative firm on the basis of their patronage (Barton 
1989). Such a governance structure implies that members-owners have easier access to the 
organization‟s decision makers. This access is further facilitated by the fact that the 
farmer-members are also users of the services provided by their cooperative. This can lead 
members to maneuver attempts in order to influence management‟s decisions to their 
benefit. In contrast, primarily, or exclusively employees in IOFs attempt to influence 
decisions. . Consequently, decision-making in diversified customer-and producer-oriented 
firms can be more complicated relative to IOFs of comparable size. 
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Second, residual income rights are not tradable in any secondary market as is the 
case in publicly-traded IOFs where owners can monitor managerial performance by 
observing variations in the company‟s stock value. Hence, in the absence of market 
monitoring tools, managers in traditional cooperatives are more flexible to pursue goals 
inconsistent with those of the membership as a whole. This problem, which has been 
identified as the “control problem” (e.g., Vitaliano 1983; Cook 1995), has an additional 
negative implication for firm performance not explicitly discussed in the literature. 
Cooperative managers may be more easily influenced toward advancing the interests of 
sub-groups of members since tight market monitoring does not alarm them. Thus the 
control problem may be transformed into a complex multiple principal-influence costs 
problem, which generates additional costs not usually observed in IOFs. 
Given this multiplicity of principals and the open channels available to both 
members and employees for influencing decision-making, every resource allocation 
decision in cooperatives becomes a potential source of influence costs. Crucial resource 
allocation decisions regarding the allotment of capital to the various budget types (e.g., 
capital, operating and human resource budgets) create rents, which are more significant in 
case cooperative members have incongruent interests. Members pursuing their diverging 
individual interests may force decision-makers to deviate from maximum-efficiency 
business decisions. 
Influence costs incurred by agribusiness cooperatives are classified into one of the 
following categories: (1) opportunity costs of cooperative stakeholders‟ time, (2) costs of 
monitoring and enforcing decisions that create quasi-rents, (3) coordination and 
measurement costs associated with delayed decisions, (4) costs of wrong or no decisions, 
and (5) costs associated with policies designed and implemented to avoid influence costs 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Iliopoulos and Cook 1999). According to Milgrom and 
Roberts (1988), organizations have four options in dealing with the influence costs 
problem. First, they can close communication channels for certain decisions. Second, they 
can reduce the return to influence activities by limiting decision makers‟ discretion and 
restricting their ability to respond to information supplied by others. Third, they can 
decentralize and separate business units (e.g. by spinning off some operations). Finally, 
they can adjust compensation, promotion, investment, and other criteria in order to align 
individual goals with those of the organization.  
Most of the above options are either not available to or cannot be implemented by 
cooperatives. Limiting employees‟ access to communication channels is considerably 
easier than restricting the access of cooperative members to such channels because the 
latter are also owners of the organization. The adoption of this strategy may generate more 
problems than decision makers have intended to solve. Equally difficult to implement are 
policies that restrict cooperative managers‟ ability to respond to information supplied by 
members. Actually, this information channel has been accredited as one of the key 
competitive advantages of agribusiness cooperatives relative to IOFs (e.g., Hansmann 
1996). The third option of decentralizing and separating units has been primarily adopted 
by several European agribusiness cooperatives (Hendrikse and Bijman 2002). However, 
the success of this strategy depends, among other things, on the size of the cooperative 
(Cook and Chaddad 2006). 
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Hypotheses 
The manager of an agricultural cooperative develops and implements policy proposals in 
order to bring the assets of the cooperative to value. The manager chooses among many 
investment possibilities not all of which generate the same rent for cooperative members. 
This provides scope for influence activities as each member attempts to force cooperative 
decision makers to choose and carry out those proposals that are most beneficial to her or 
him.  
This section formulates hypotheses starting from the premise that both the manager 
and members advance their own personal interests. The interplay between the manager 
and cooperative members is ambiguous. On the one hand, members are powerful because 
as owners of the enterprise they influence the career prospects of the manager. On the 
other hand, the manager is often at least as powerful because (s)he has access to superior 
information about investment opportunities, market developments and intra-organizational 
issues. Another source of power is that usually the manager puts together investment 
proposals. This provides the manager with leeway regarding the size of the rent to be paid 
to one or all members, while the members choose the degree of their influence activities 
and at the same time exercise their voting right and decide whether to keep or replace the 
manager. 
A number of theoretical perspectives have been advanced to explain/ predict the 
outcome of this interaction between the manager and members. They identify a number of 
variables having an impact on the amount of rent that will be distributed and the extent of 
influence activities. We highlight the variables membership size, heterogeneity of the 
membership, the average age of the membership, the singleness of purpose, the manager‟s 
power over members, level of the manager‟s compensation, and professional versus inside 
management. 
Agribusiness cooperatives vary substantially in terms of the size of their 
membership. Some cooperatives have less than 100 while others have more than 10,000 
members. The probability of a member being successful in influencing decision-making 
activities decreases when the membership size increases. This will result in a lower level 
of influence activities per member when membership size increases (Appelbaum and Katz 
1987). In addition, the organization will structure itself in such a way to limit / handle an 
increasing number of sources of influence activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1988; 1990). 
This relationship is summarized in our first hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the membership size the lower the number of influence 
activities employed by members in cooperatives 
In single-commodity marketing cooperatives, in which the membership is not 
divided among various crops, members may still deliver substantially different product 
quantities. A policy that allocates overhead costs equally among members may result in a 
transfer of wealth from high- to low-volume producers. In this case, the provision of 
quantity discounts for high-volume producers may result in high influence costs. Large-
volume producer-members are likely to be important to the cooperative, particularly if, as 
is often the case, a relatively small number of large producers deliver a very large 
proportion of the production handled by the cooperative. Strengthened by their increased 
bargaining power, large-volume producers demand special treatment and usually succeed 
in capturing, not only the value of the economies derived from their being a large-volume 
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member, but also in extracting favored treatment in excess of such gains. Pressure for 
different treatment can lead to serious dissension. Various similar differences between 
members can be formulated, e.g. quality differences, geographical differences, age 
differences, and so on. 
Several observable business practices, behaviors and policies provide a crude 
manifestation of the existence of influence activities in agricultural cooperatives. One 
indicator of influence activities in marketing and bargaining cooperatives is the use of a 
third party (an independent company) for grading/classifying the products delivered by 
members to the cooperative (Hansmann 1996). Cooperative chief executive officers may 
use this practice to avoid influence attempts by members who want to receive a high price 
for low-quality produce. Hypothesis 2 highlights the importance of member heterogeneity 
for the extent of influence activities. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The less heterogeneous the membership the fewer are the number of 
influence activities by cooperative members 
 
Major among the problems triggered off by the vaguely defined property rights 
structure of traditional cooperatives is the horizon constraint which refers to the 
disincentive for cooperative members to invest in long-term projects. Benefits flowing to 
the patron instead of the investor are the genesis of this cooperative investment problem 
also. Specifically, the horizon problem occurs when a member's residual claim on the net 
income generated by an asset is shorter than the productive life of that asset (Porter and 
Scully 1987). This problem is caused by restrictions on transferability of residual claimant 
rights and the lack of liquidity through a secondary market for the transfer of such rights. 
The horizon problem creates an investment environment in which there is a disincentive 
for members to contribute to growth opportunities. The severity of this problem intensifies 
when considering investment in research and development, advertisement, and other 
intangible assets. Consequently, there is pressure on the board of directors and 
management to increase the proportion of the cooperative's cash flow devoted to current 
payments to members relative to investment, and to accelerate equity redemptions at the 
expense of retained earnings. In this case the influence costs problem manifests itself as a 
negative side effect of the horizon constraint. Yet, in traditional cooperatives the latter 
problem is intensified as the number of members who are older in age increases.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The older the majority of cooperative members are the larger is the 
amount of influence activities employed by cooperative members  
 
Marketing multiple products has the potential to create significant intra-cooperative 
problems in terms of rent-setting policies and director loyalty and responsibility. The 
conflicting interests of cooperative members and the accompanying decisions that lead to 
wealth redistribution can take several forms. For example, the conflicting interests of 
members in multiple-commodity marketing cooperatives are often severe. Even when 
such a cooperative adopts a separate-pools system, cost allocation decisions are tough to 
make.  Under separate pooling, the growers of different commodities have little interest in 
the overall profitability of the operation of the business. The result is likely to be intense 
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and potentially disruptive disagreement that fatally limits managerial discretion to operate 
efficiently in the market. 
The frequency of serious disagreements between members of the cooperative and 
particularly those serving on the Board of Directors is an indicator of the influence costs 
problem. As disagreements between members intensify, influence costs tend to increase. 
Consequently, CEOs in cooperatives incurring high influence costs are expected to spend 
a significant part of their time in dealing with influence attempts by members. 
Additionally, cooperative managers may maintain a notable portion of total equity as 
unallocated so that they can respond to the particular interests of different groups of 
members, especially in cooperatives with highly heterogeneous memberships. Logrolling 
provides yet another indicator of influence activities. Board members who represent 
different subgroups of members may agree to support each other when their most vital 
interests are not contradictory (Staatz 1987). A final indicator of inefficient influence 
activities and outcomes is that especially federated (multi-product) cooperatives have been 
targets of private equity parties (Bekkum 2007). Hypothesis 4 formulates the relationship 
between multi-product cooperatives and the intensity of influence activities. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Members of multi product cooperatives tend to employ more 
influence activities than members of single product cooperatives 
 
Leadership is an important issue in cooperatives (Cook 1994). An efficient leader 
will be able to reduce wasteful influence activities due to being able to increase the 
likelihood of obtaining acceptance for the efficient investment proposals. Such a leader 
reduces the likelihood that surplus reducing influence activities survive in open group 
decision-making processes. A smaller rent available for members reduces their incentive 
to spend resources on influence activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1988; 1990). A strong 
manager is often also powerful, i.e. (s)he is able to allocate a substantial share of the rent 
to the activities of the cooperative rather than to the members. This reduces also the level 
of influence activities (Appelbaum and Katz 1987). The following hypothesis summarizes 
these ideas. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The more powerful the cooperative’s managers the less the tendency 
of its members to use influence activities 
 
The outside opportunities available for the manager have an impact on the surplus 
available for rent seeking activities (Appelbaum and Katz 1987). More attractive outside 
opportunities for the manager will increase his/ her salary and therefore reduce the surplus 
available for the members. Outside opportunities can be made less attractive by paying a 
salary above the market wage, i.e. an efficiency wage (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), in order 
to prevent the manager from leaving when (s)he is performing well. Hypothesis 6 
summarizes these ideas. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The less attractive the cooperative manager’s outside opportunities 
the fewer influence activities are employed by members  
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Many cooperatives choose one of their members as the manager. Having a member-
manager has advantages as well as disadvantages. An obvious advantage is that this 
person knows the business and the membership very well. A disadvantage is that a 
member-manager may not have detailed knowledge of final product markets. Another 
potential disadvantage is that the manager has to decide about investment projects 
generating different rents for the various members. S/he may find it hard to take necessary 
but painful decisions because s/he continues to be a member of the cooperative after his/ 
her management period. These disadvantages may make an outside manager attractive. 
Among the factors that determine the success or failure of a cooperative, hiring a full-time 
professional manager is consistently ranked as highly important (e.g., Sexton and Iskow 
1988; Staatz 1987). Hypothesis 7 formulates the outside manager effect.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Members of cooperatives with external (non-member) managers 
tend to employ less influence activities than members of cooperatives with internal 
(member) manager? 
 
Methods 
This section presents the sample and data collection, the measures, and the type of analysis 
used to test our hypotheses. 
 
Sample and data collection 
Case studies were selected from a number of English language sources by using the 
keyword “cooperative”. The following data sources were searched: 
 The Harvard Business School Cases. 
 Proceedings of conferences, symposia, and seminars organized by the European and 
American associations of agricultural economists. 
 Proceedings of the annual meeting of the International Association for New Institutional 
Economics. 
 A list of indexed academic journals (see Appendix 1). 
 The on-line publications of the following research centers and governmental agencies: 
 University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives 
 University of Saskatchewan Centre for Co-operatives 
 British Columbia Institute for Co-operatives 
 Agribusiness Research Institute of the University of Missouri 
 Filene Research Institute 
 Rural Development Agency of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) 
 The on-line publications of the Research Network for Agricultural Cooperatives 
(www.ernac.net). 
The search generated a list of 915 papers, 120 of which were case studies. 
Subsequently, those cases that focus on one or more aspects of influence activities in 
cooperatives were selected. Table 1 presents the resulting sample. A brief description of 
each case follows. 
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Table 1 
Sample 
 
 
Case Study 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Authors 
 
 
Hypotheses 
Tested 
Independent 
Evaluation of 
Pattern-
Matching 
(Internal 
Validity) 
 
Cebeco 
 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Bijman 
(2005); 
Goldberg 
(1989) 
 
H1, H2, H4 
 H1: 5.45 
H2: 6.5 
H4: 6.0 
 
 
Sugar 
Cooperatives 
of Maharashtra 
 
India 
 
Banerjee et al. 
(2001) 
 
H1, H2 
 
H1: 5.10 
 
H2: 6.5 
 
Tri Valley 
Growers 
 
USA 
 
Goldberg and 
Carter (1997); 
Hariyoga and 
Sexton (2004) 
 
H4 
 
 
 
H4: 6.1 
Renville 
Cluster of New 
Generation 
Cooperatives 
 
USA 
 
Cook et al. 
(2005) 
 
H3 
 
H3: 6.15 
 
Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool 
(SWP) 
 
Canada 
 
Goldberg and 
Kennedy 
(1988); 
Painter 
(1997); 
Goldberg and 
 
 
 
H2, H4 
 
H2: 6.0 
H4:  6.0 
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Shelman 
(2005) 
 
Douro Wine 
Cooperatives 
 
Portugal 
 
Rebelo et al. 
(2003) 
 
H7 
 
H7: 6.0 
 
Polish 
Producer 
Groups 
 
Poland 
 
Banaszak 
(2007) 
 
H1, H5 
 H1: 4.45 
H5: 6.0 
 
The Kerry 
Group 
 
Ireland 
 
Kennelly 
(2000) 
 
H5 
 
 H5: 6.05 
 
Upper 
Midwest 
Cooperative 
Cases 
 
USA 
 
Trechter et al. 
(1997) 
 
H6 
 
 H6: 6.55 
 
Californian 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 
Marketing 
Cooperatives 
 
USA 
 
Hansmann 
(1996); 
Hetherington 
(1991) 
 
H2, H4 
 
H2: 6.4 
  H4: 6.15 
 
Co-op AG 
 
Germany 
 
Burt (1991) 
 
H1, H2 
 H1: 4.75 
H2: 6.0 
The Berkeley 
Co-op 
USA  
Fullerton 
(1992) 
 
H2 
 
 H2: 6.35 
 Table 1: Sample 
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CEBECO: Cebeco was a Dutch multipurpose agribusiness cooperative, with over 200 
subsidiaries in such diverse industries as feed ingredients, pesticides, plant breeding, eggs, 
potatoes, meats and airline meals. Its federated structure included 22 local cooperatives 
with more than 40,000 farmer-members. In 2001, the Royal Cebeco Group celebrated its 
centenary and an annual turnover of approximately €4 billion. However, two years later 
turnover had been reduced to €626 million. 
SUGAR COOPERATIVES OF MAHARASHTRA: India is the largest producer of 
sugar in the world and its western state of Maharashtra is India‟s largest producer. Over 90 
percent of the sugar output of the state is produced by cooperatives, most of which were 
set up with the encouragement and support of the state government since the 1950s. Each 
cooperative is jointly owned by the growers in the local area and owns crushing and 
processing facilities that convert raw sugarcane, collected from its grower-members, into 
finished sugar. This sugar is sold on the market and the resulting revenues, net of 
collection and processing costs are distributed among the growers. 
TRI VALLEY GROWERS COOPERATIVE: Tri Valley Growers (TVG) was a multi-
product marketing cooperative in California. Its more than 500 member-owners delivered 
primarily tomatoes, peaches, peas, pears, and olives for processing and marketing. In 
1998, the cooperative‟s sales revenue reached $782 million while members‟ equity was 
$125 million.  TVG employed 1,500 permanent and 9,500 seasonal personnel. In July 
2000, insurmountable financial difficulties forced TVG to file a voluntary petition for 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and its assets were sold to 
various buyers.    
RENVILLE CLUSTER OF COOPERATIVES: Located in Minnesota‟s western Corn 
Belt, Renville County is home to more than 1,500 family farms.  Average farm size is 570 
acres and the average market value of products sold per farm is over $270,000. In 2002, 
Renville ranked number one in Minnesota in acres of corn for grain and soybeans with 
247,053 and 245,244 acres, respectively. Renville County also ranked third in the state in 
acres of sugarbeets harvested with slightly more than 48,000 acres.  Renville‟s land is 
productive, but transportation costs often put area farmers at a commodity-trading or 
marketing disadvantage.  Nonetheless, Renville is widely recognized as a highly 
innovative community, where producers experiment with the latest technologies and 
business arrangements. Starting in the early 1990s, Renville County became known for 
several progressive and innovative producer-owned and -controlled cooperatives.  Six are 
new generation cooperatives (NGCs): Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative 
(SMBSC), ValAdCo, Golden Oval Eggs (GOE), Churchill Cooperative, MinAqua, and 
Minnesota Energy. The City of Renville, home to four NGCs, bills itself as America‟s 
“Cooperative Capital”. 
SASKATCHEWAN WHEAT POOL: In 1996, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP), the 
largest grain handling and agricultural marketing cooperative in Canada, changed its 
ownership structure to become a new generation cooperative.  This transition has not been 
unopposed. Some of the members have suggested that SWP is no longer a real cooperative 
and that it is not different from any other public corporation. However, the proposal was 
voted down by the required member majority. 
Recently SWP merged with Agricore United. The new company, named Viterra, is 
the number one grain handler in Canada but also a major player in agricultural inputs, 
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processed food, livestock and the provision of financial products.  The year ending on 
April 2007 the before taxes earnings of the company were over $350 millions.
3
 
DOURO WINE COOPERATIVES: By producing over 20 percent of the Portuguese 
wine, Douro in northeastern Portugal is the most important wine-producing region of the 
country. Small family farms are the predominant form of organization in local agriculture; 
on average each grape producer cultivates around 1.17 hectares of land. The 22 wine 
cooperatives of the region have adopted the traditional cooperative model and represent 
more than 16,000 wine producers. On average they have 723 members but wine 
production per member is typically quite limited (58 percent of members produce ten or 
fewer barrels per year; 82 percent of members produce fewer than 20 barrels per year). 
Furthermore, 61 percent of cooperative members are 50 years or older. Despite their large 
membership and the complexity of the coordination and motivation issues facing the 
Douro wine cooperatives, only half of them have hired professionals to manage the 
organization. 
POLISH PRODUCER GROUPS: Polish farmer organizations called Producer Groups 
emerged in the mid-1990s. Their principal goal was to market jointly their members‟ 
agricultural produce. Among the services provided to member-farmers are buyer 
identification, contract negotiation, and transportation. These groups have adopted various 
legal forms (e.g., cooperative, Limited Liability Company) but informal oral agreements 
have also been used as a means of coordination. Over 60 such groups were founded in the 
Wielkopolska province of Poland. However, by 2006 20 percent of the groups were 
disbanded. Furthermore, only 80 percent of the active groups kept performing their main 
task of organizing joint sales; the remaining groups focused solely on providing various 
services to their members. Even some of the active groups, however, were not able to 
negotiate any price premium for their members‟ output and were selling their products at 
the same price as non-members farmers; others were able to negotiate as much as a 39 
percent higher price premium for their members. 
THE KERRY GROUP PLC: Beginning as a collection of small dairy cooperative 
societies in rural county Kerry, Ireland, in 1974, Kerry Group plc had by 1996, grown to 
the status of a full-fledged multinational concern with manufacturing operations and 
markets throughout the world. In 1996, the Kerry Group had sales revenue of $1.92 billion 
and an after-tax profit of $78.4 million.  The Kerry Group was led by an experienced 
management team, most of whom had been with Kerry since its inception as a cooperative 
in 1974. Indeed, one of the key elements often cited by the local Kerry community for the 
success of the cooperative was the leadership and vision of its managing director, Denis 
Brosnan. 
UPPER MIDWEST COOPERATIVES: Five Midwestern agricultural cooperatives are 
examined in the Trechter et al. (1997) study whose names are undisclosed. These local 
cooperatives focus primarily on grain and oilseed marketing, and input supplies for their 
members. Between 1990 and 1994 their average sales revenues ranged from $5 million to 
$20 million per year. 
CALIFORNIAN FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKETING COOPERATIVES: In 
2006, 82 marketing cooperatives operated in California. More than half of them marketed 
fruit and vegetables and had net sales of $2,143 million (USDA 2006). These cooperatives 
represent an important institutional arrangement in Californian agriculture. They range 
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from the simplest organizational form of a bargaining association to highly complex multi-
product marketing cooperatives. 
CO-OP AG: German consumer cooperatives developed in a pattern similar to the British 
Rochdale model, spreading rapidly in German cities after 1890. After the Second World 
War they were rebuilt and in 1960 the total sales of Western Germany consumer 
cooperatives rose to 3.2 billion German Marks. At the same time they were the country‟s 
third-largest employer by employing 80,000 workers and executives. The largest 
consumer cooperative of Western Germany was Coop AG.  In January 1988 it was the 
fourth largest retailer with annual sales of more than 10 million Marks. However, in 1991, 
following a financial scandal the cooperative went bankrupt and the group‟s assets were 
sold to various competitors. 
THE BERKELEY COOPERATIVE: Commencing in 1937, the Berkeley Co-op 
reached a height of 116,000 members, mostly family households who purchased 82 
million dollars worth of goods and services a year. Despite its success, several factors led 
gradually to its downfall in the late 1980‟s. Heterogeneous member preferences, a vague 
objective function, and the lack of efficient communication of policies to members were 
among the chief reasons behind the cooperative‟s demise in 1988. 
 
Measures 
The data varies from qualitative case descriptions to quantitative indicators. Scores of a 
variables‟ values are based as much as possible on data, not on an author‟s conclusions 
(Rosenthal, 1995 and Dul and Hak, 2008). In order to avoid research bias in data analysis 
and interpretation all study findings were subjected to a group of five outside researchers-
evaluators who concluded that the findings appear to be logical and free from prejudice 
(Johnston et al. 1999).  
 
Analysis 
Data analysis in case study research entails „pattern matching‟ (Dul and Hak 2008, 95). 
Pattern matching entails comparing an observed pattern of scores with the pattern 
predicted by the hypotheses (Dul and Hak, 2008). It is a non-statistical test of the 
correctness of hypotheses. Pattern-matching is used in order to ensure internal validity by 
establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other 
conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin 1994). For each of the 
theoretically-derived hypotheses all factors that may interfere in the stated causal 
relationship were considered. Subsequently, each case study was assessed. The following 
list includes the questions addressed during pattern-matching: 
 Is the inference correct? 
 Have all the rival explanations and possibilities been considered? 
 Is the evidence convergent? 
 Does the evidence appear to be sound? 
The same questions were posed to the abovementioned evaluators who were asked 
to assess each case on a seven-point scale and the average for each hypothesis with 
respect to each case was calculated
4
 (Table 1). When more than one case was used to test 
a hypothesis, the mean of the average scores across evaluators was calculated. The final 
approval of pattern-matching was based on the rule of thumb: accept scores equal or 
higher than five. 
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Results 
This section presents the results from comparing the data of the cases with the hypotheses 
derived from theory. 
The cases are inconclusive regarding hypothesis 1. The case studies of Cebeco, 
Indian sugar cooperatives, and Co-op AG show that the influence costs incurred by 
cooperatives tend to increase as additional members join their membership. It is unclear, 
however, whether this result is due to a larger number of members or other factors such as 
increased member heterogeneity when new products are added to the product portfolio of 
the cooperative. On the other hand, when member preferences are homogeneous a larger 
membership may result in lower influence costs. In Polish producer groups, which 
represent a form of cooperative entrepreneurship, intra-organizational rent-seeking is 
reduced as additional members join the association (Banaszak 2007). Therefore, this case 
indicates that it may not be the absolute size of membership that boosts influence costs. 
The reported case studies strongly support hypothesis 2. Membership heterogeneity 
makes cooperative decision-making cumbersome by boosting member influence attempts. 
In principle, revenues are supposed to be paid out to the growers as a uniform price so that 
each member‟s share is proportional to the amount of sugarcane delivered. In practice, 
members who are powerful within the cooperative will try to capture more than their fair 
share of the revenues. In the sugar cooperatives of Maharashtra, India, the rent-seeking 
behavior of large-volume producers has resulted in the underpricing of sugarcane. This 
inefficient policy is ascribed to both the large number of producers and the diverging 
preferences of large- and small-volume producers of sugarcane who participate in the local 
cooperatives (Banerjee et al. 2001). Influence costs are incurred even by organizationally 
simple cooperatives. In California, price adjustments for quality and condition of fruit 
delivered by members, price differentials for early and late varieties, and the arrangements 
to be made to compensate growers whose fruit is not sold have been sources of conflict 
among the members of fruit bargaining associations (Hansmann 1996).  
In a nut marketing cooperative, contrary to the organization‟s bylaws, a large-
volume member demanded that it be allowed to deliver to the cooperative those grades for 
which the cooperative was paying the higher price and to deliver the remaining grades to 
an investor-owned processor who was paying for those grades a price higher than the 
cooperative.  The member was large enough to threaten to withdraw and to establish his 
own processing facility.  The board decided to accept this demand to the interest of the 
remaining members of the cooperative (Hetherington 1991). 
In a totally different setting, consumer cooperatives face similar problems.  The case 
of the Consumer Cooperative of Berkeley illustrates the fatal contribution of influence 
activities to the demise of a collective enterprise. A book published by the University of 
California, presents the views of various cooperative leaders and stakeholders on the 
reasons behind the dissolution of the cooperative (Fullerton 1992). Influence costs 
imposed by a series of wrong managerial and board decisions played a fatal role and led to 
the gradual demise of the Berkeley Cooperative. Heterogeneous member preferences over 
the goods and services supplied made reaching consensus on crucial operational and 
strategy decisions time-consuming and unmanageable. 
The consumer cooperative “co-op AG” in former Western Germany provides 
additional support for this hypothesis. Its successful evolution since 1974 attracted a large, 
  
 14 
highly heterogeneous, membership unable to monitor management efficiently. As a result 
decision-making gradually became very inefficient and managers were able to implement 
policies that advanced their personal interests but led to the demise of the cooperative 
(Burt 1991). 
The phenomenon observed in the Minnesota town of Renville, USA, provides 
support for hypothesis 3. The Southern Minnesota Sugar Beet Cooperative was the first to 
develop and adopt what is today known worldwide as the innovative „new generation 
cooperative‟ (NGC) organizational structure.  Subsequently, many farmers from the 
Renville area started organizing value-added NGCs in various commodities. Cook et al. 
(2005) studied nine of these cooperatives. They indicate a positive relationship between 
the age of the average cooperative member and the influence costs incurred by the 
cooperative. 
Hypothesis 4 is supported by the evidence reported in the Cebeco and Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool case studies. In Cebeco, the Dutch multi-purpose agribusiness cooperative, 
achieving the right balance between influence costs and listening to what members have to 
say about the organization‟s affairs proved to be an unattainable goal. The high level of 
influence costs is mainly attributed to the large number of highly heterogeneous members, 
a non-representative voting system, and the inability of members to exercise effective 
control over management (Bijman 2005). Their was scope for substantial influence 
activities in Cebeco was due to vaguely defined property rights producing investment 
disincentives for members, altered consumer preferences, and lack of control over crucial 
stages in several of its supply chains. 
The involvement of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in many different industries 
resulted in a highly heterogeneous membership. Combined with the withdrawal of 
government support in the 1980‟s the heterogeneity-induced influence costs forced the 
cooperative to restructure in order to become more market-oriented (Goldberg and 
Kennedy 1988). Developments were more dramatic in the case of Tri Valley Growers. 
The bankruptcy of the cooperative is partially explained by its failure to implement 
separate pools for fruits and tomatoes (Hariyoga and Sexton 2004). The extraction of rents 
from fruit producers to compensate tomato producers who received low prices for their 
crop resulted in high influence costs and inefficient responses to rapidly changing market 
conditions. 
Cooperative leaders and managers play a crucial role in minimizing rent-seeking 
activities. The evolution of the Irish Kerry Group provides support for hypothesis 5 
(Kennelly 2000). During the mid-1980s the local dairy cooperative was transformed into a 
multinational company. While the majority of members supported this conversion, it was 
not completely without opposition and influence cost-generating internal conflicts. The 
senior management team headed by CEO Denis Brosnan played a crucial role in 
communicating the prospective benefits of their proposal to members and finally 
convincing them to vote for it. 
In the case of Polish Producer Groups influential, experienced leaders contribute to 
the success of their organizations at least in two ways (Banaszak 2007). First, they play an 
active role in channelling information in an efficient, influence cost-minimizing way. 
Second, they minimize the negative impact that a large membership size has on 
communication and coordination costs. However, how successful managers are in these 
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roles depends crucially on their individual personal qualities. In other Polish Producer 
Groups an extremely powerful manager has resulted in the demise of the organization.   
These findings accord with the personal managerial experience of Cook (1994) who 
argues that the „entrepreneur,‟ „disturbance or conflict handler,‟ „negotiator,‟ and „resource 
allocator‟ decision making roles of management are very different in cooperatives than in 
investor-oriented firms. The more diffuse objective function and the vaguely defined 
property rights of traditional cooperatives contribute to a more complex decision matrix. 
Particularly, cooperative managers need to possess special interpersonal skills in dealing 
with intra-organizational conflicts. As the author observes: „The user-owner uniqueness of 
cooperatives forces a cooperative manager interested in minimizing conflicts between 
members to take a more integrated view of the fixed costs of the cooperative‟s user-owner 
when attempting to optimize the vaguely defined objective function of the association.  It 
also encourages cooperative managers to be more interdependent and interactive with 
users-owners in executing interpersonal and leadership roles. Consequently, conflict 
resolution for the cooperative manager probably means peace-keeping sojourns to the 
country more frequently than his/her counterpart.‟ 
Support for hypothesis 6 is provided by Trechter et al. (1997). Adopting a multiple-
case study methodology, they compare the impact of managerial compensation on the 
efficiency of cooperative decision-making. Their findings from five cooperatives in the 
upper Midwest of the US suggest that the compensation method is less important than the 
manager‟s perception that the level and composition of her salary are fair. Managers 
perceiving their salary as being equal to or higher than the salary they could earn in 
another occupation tend to implement more efficient policies. Subsequently, less influence 
attempts are observed in such cooperatives. As reported in a survey of Midwestern 
agricultural cooperatives, boards choose compensation policies that can be sustained in the 
long run and encourage managerial actions that, among other things, minimize influence 
attempts (King et al. 1997). 
The case of Portuguese Douro wine cooperatives provides evidence supporting 
hypothesis 7. In Mediterranean and South American countries many agribusiness 
cooperatives are managed by one or more of their members, usually on a part time basis. 
Cooperatives in the Duro wine region of northeastern Portugal represent such a case. Rent-
seeking-induced decision-making inefficiencies along with risk capital accumulation 
challenges facing these organizations are higher when compared to cooperatives who hire 
non-member, professional executives to run their business. Fuelled by a unique 
combination of socio-economic characteristics and farmer demographics, the resulting 
horizon and free rider problems give rise to internal conflicts over which the members 
battle.  The lack of managerial and/or board experience constrains the ability of member-
managers to implement influence-minimizing policies.   
Even in some of the most recently founded wine cooperatives in the Douro region 
which hire professional executives, the manager has limited discretionary power in setting 
cooperative strategies and policies. Entrapped by coalitions of members-owners who 
pursue their group interests managers have difficulties in managing areas such as the 
capital structure or member relations. Two of the most pressing issues that these 
cooperatives have to deal with are investment disincentives facing members, and influence 
battles taking place between competing groups of member-owners (Rebelo et al. 2003). 
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Conclusions and Future Research 
What are the sources of influence costs? This article contributes to addressing this 
question by focusing on the governance structure cooperative. Cooperatives are 
informative regarding the sources of influence costs due to the multiplicity of principals.  
Members / principals collectively delegate substantial discretion to an agent / CEO, 
subsequently eliciting influence activities by members. The case studies presented indicate 
that heterogeneous member preferences contribute substantial to higher influence costs. 
Older average member age and investment in multiple product lines also result in higher 
influence costs. At the same time, cooperatives with well-paid, powerful and professional 
managers incur lower influence costs. The impact of membership size on the level of 
influence costs is ambiguous. 
 This research offers a preliminary test of the theoretically derived hypotheses by 
determining what the existing case studies say about them. It is preliminary because 
various hypotheses are addressed only once or twice (see Table 1). One of the implications 
for future research is therefore that series of replications are needed. One-shot tests of 
hypotheses are valuable, but they should be treated with caution due to either the case not 
being representative of the domain or the possibility that an erroneous conclusion has been 
drawn. Having replications with similar conclusions will increase the confidence in the 
correctness of the findings. Another limitation of this research is that most cases do not 
address all aspects of the studied phenomenon. Thus considering all relevant factors that 
might affect a causal relationship was difficult. A remedy for both limitations would be to 
use a true multiple-case design. 
 The results suggest that certain aspects of management and members have to be 
highlighted in future research regarding influence activities in cooperatives. Three aspects 
of management are addressed. First, the case study evidence reported suggests that 
managerial compensation may act as an important influence cost-minimizing device. An 
increase in the manager‟s salary leads to a decrease in the influence costs incurred as long 
as the manager perceives this salary as fair relative to the compensation he or she can get 
in an alternative occupation. A straightforward implication is that well-paid cooperative 
managers tend to initiate policies that minimize the influence costs incurred by 
agribusiness cooperatives. This result is consistent with the literature on efficiency wages 
(e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). By paying a salary higher than her next best alternative 
occupation, the principals attempt to provide the manager with incentives to minimize 
influence costs. An apparent problem is that it is impossible for all cooperatives to pay 
higher wages than all other cooperatives. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) propose 
unemployment as an escape from this dilemma. A manager who loses a job is not 
immediately able to find another and so suffers a loss, even though once he or she finds 
employment again, it is at the same high salary as before. Of course, the output that could 
have been produced by these temporarily unemployed represents a social cost.  
 Second, the role of management in minimizing harmful intra-cooperative rent-
seeking activities is also highlighted. Acting as conflict handlers, managers that exert 
power over members are able to function in the best interest of the cooperative firm. The 
flipside of this, however, is that extremely powerful managers may be difficult to monitor 
and thus may advance their own agenda to the detriment of the organization. Finding the 
right balance between managerial power and the implementation of procedures that serve 
the common good may turn out to be difficult. 
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 Finally, the degree of separation between managerial and board roles also affects the 
extent of member influence attempts. In some countries agribusiness cooperatives are 
managed by one or more of their members.  According to the case studies examined, this 
practice may give rise to influence costs not incurred by cooperatives which are run by 
professional managers. In combination with structural and demographic characteristics, 
internal management may explain the difficulties these cooperatives have in ameliorating 
vaguely defined property rights-induced problems such as the free rider, horizon, and 
portfolio constraints.      
 Two aspects of members are addressed. First, it is the heterogeneity of member 
preferences rather than membership size resulting in intra-cooperative, influence cost-
boosting decision making. A related conclusion of the case studies examined is that multi-
product cooperatives tend to incur higher influence costs. These results match well the 
observed trend toward single-product marketing cooperatives with less heterogeneous 
members (Chaddad and Cook 2004). 
 Second, cooperatives whose average member faces a horizon constraint due to older 
age incur higher influence costs than their counterparts with a younger membership. An 
implication of this observation is that cooperatives that issue transferable and appreciable 
equity instruments may be able to ameliorate this aspect of the influence costs problem. 
More generally, new generation cooperatives have partially solved the influence costs 
problem by reallocating their income and decision rights. 
  Finally, two directions for future research beyond the specified hypotheses are 
indicated by the case studies: organizational change and governance structure. First, 
influence activities are intended to have an impact on the decisions made by the 
organization. A decision may result in no change but most often it entails that adjustments 
or changes have to be implemented. The cases in our sample show that cooperatives 
respond in different ways to inefficiencies. For example, Cebeco divested its poorly 
operating units and focused on its primary strengths. Other cooperatives fail to respond to 
the challenges imposed by membership heterogeneity. The demise of Tri Valley Growers, 
the Berkeley Cooperative, and the Co-op AG are examples of this failure. This raises the 
question of what determines organizational change. The CEO and member heterogeneity 
are likely to play an important role.    
 Future work has to take into account additional issues regarding governance 
structure into account. Governance structure parameters that may alter the incentives of 
cooperative stakeholders to engage in resource-consuming influence activities include the 
type of membership structure (open or defined membership), the particular voting system 
adopted (e.g., one-member, one-vote versus proportional voting), the pooling system 
(single versus multiple pools for products, capital/risk, etc.), the property rights structure 
of the cooperative (e.g., the role of transferable and appreciable ownership instruments), 
and the separation of managerial and control functions. Behind these issues lies the need 
to allocate decision and income rights to cooperative stakeholders so that a diverse set of 
challenges are met. For example, the allocation of decision and income rights should 
ensure that major decisions are consonant with the cooperative‟s strategy, that they are 
financially well-justified, that the evaluation of decisions are not excessively tainted by the 
personal and career interests of the managers involved, and that the process taps the 
knowledge of those who are best informed. Yet, these individuals are often the very same 
people whose personal interests are most affected by this allocation. Another fruitful 
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avenue for future research is comparing the influence costs incurred by other governance 
structures such as franchising systems, collective trademarks, relational contracting, and 
alliances to those observed in cooperatives and IOFs. This will shed light on the key 
differences of hybrids with respect to the level of influence activities each of these 
governance structures brings upon itself.  
 
Endnotes 
1 The agribusiness cooperative is one of the many forms of producer-owned firms (POFs) 
commonly observed in the production and marketing of food and beverages. Several 
scholars have studied is unique governance structure. (e.g., Cook 1995; Hendrikse and 
Veerman 2001). 
2 The interaction of multiple principals is one of the key features of hybrid governance 
structures (Hendrikse 2007). 
3 Information on recent developments regarding SWP and Viterra was accessed on 
December 8, 2007, at: www.viterra.ca.    
4 The names and scores of the independent evaluators are available upon request from the 
authors. 
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